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Indiana University Bloomington

BEPP

The Kelley Advantage

The department is home to the authors of Managerial Economics and Business Strategy and Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, two of the nation’s leading textbooks in the field.

Research and Publications

Journal Articles

Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction Theoretic Approach

2005, Economic Journal

Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. de Vries

Abstract

A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The British rule, Continental rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model.

Citation

Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, and Casper G. de Vries, "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction Theoretic Approach," Economic Journal, Vol. 115 (July 2005), pp. 583-601.

Keywords

Auctions, Contests, Litigation, Fee-Shifting.