Skip to: search, navigation, or content.


Indiana University Bloomington

Doctoral Programs

1960 Notable

From 1960-2013, we prepared nearly 1,200 men and women
for rewarding academic careers — that’s more than any other university.

Journal Articles

Folk Theorems for the Observable Implications of Repeated Games

1992, Theory and Decision

Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Abstract

 The fact that infinitely repeated games have many different equilibrium outcomes is known as the Folk Theorem. Previous versions of the Folk Theorem have characterized only the payoffs of the game. This paper shows that over a finite portion of an infinitely repeated game, the concept of perfect equilibrium imposes virtually no restrictions on observable behavior. The Prisoner's Dilemma is presented as an example and discussed in detail.

Citation

Rasmusen, Eric Bennett (1992), "Folk Theorems for the Observable Implications of Repeated Games," Theory and Decision, Vol. 32, March, 147-164.