Eitan Goldman

Eitan Goldman Print-Quality Photo

Contact Information


(812) 856-0749

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Faculty Web Page

Business School

  • Associate Professor of Finance
  • FedEx Faculty Fellow

Campus

  • Bloomington

Education

  • Phd, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton Business School, 2000

Professional Interests

  • Finance

Current Projects

  • “The value of (corrupt) lobbying”, with Alex Borisov, and Nandini Gupta, 2013
  • “Optimal Board Power with Private and Public Information about CEO Talent” 2013

Selected Publications

  • Goldman, E., Huang, P. (2014), “Contractual Versus Actual Separation Pay following CEO Turnover,” forthcoming, Management Science. Read Abstract
  • Goldman, Eitan and Gunter Strobl (2013), "Large Shareholder Trading and the Complexity of Corporate Investments," Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(1): 106-122.
  • Goldman, Eitan, Jorg Rocholl, and Jongil So (2013), “Political Connections and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts," Review of Finance, 13(5), 1617-1648.
  • Goldman, Eitan, Urs Peyer, and Irina Stefanescu (2012), “The Impact of Fraudulent Earnings Manipulation on Industry Rivals,” Financial Management Journal, 41(4): 915-945.
  • Goldman, E., J. Rocholl, and J. So (2009), “Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 6, June, pp. 2331-2360.  Read Abstract
  • Goldman, Eitan and S. Slezak (2006), “An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Information Manipulation,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 80, No. 3, pp. 603-626.
  • Goldman, Eitan and Qian Jun (2005), “Optimal Toeholds in Takeover Contests,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 321-346.
  • Goldman, Eitan (2005), “Organizational Form, Information Collection, and the Value of the Firm”, Journal of Business, Vol. 78, No. 3, pp. 817-840.